

Turkish Politics as an oscillating complex system

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II. Karmasik Sistemler ve Veri Bilimi Calistayi

Cooperation & decision making under uncertainty

- Contentious politics
- Regime transition & consolidation
- International finance

Recent constitutional referendum



- Governmental stability
- Strong state
- Popular sovereignty

- Parliamentary powers
- Checks and balances
- Executive arbitrariness



Similar discourse!


- Popular sovereignty
- Parliamentary powers
- Executive arbitrariness
- Checks and balances

History repeats itself?



- Popular sovereignty
- Parliamentary powers
- Executive arbitrariness
- Checks and balances

Constitutional debates: 1860s, 1890s, 2010s



Research Question

- *Why do some societies oscillate between authoritarian and democratic regimes despite constitutional systems in place?*

Could oscillation between democratic and authoritarian regime forms be the pattern?

Research Question


- *Why do some societies oscillate between authoritarian and democratic regimes despite constitutional systems in place?*
- Could oscillation between democratic and authoritarian regime forms be the pattern?

The Argument

Oscillation is likely in situations, where a previously repressed libertarian group comes to power to change the status quo and perceives dissent as a threat.

- Part 1: Within one regime cycle, authoritarian backslide
- Part 2: Reiteration of the cycle

Within one regime cycle






Figure: Polarization and zero-sum interactions

Reiteration of the cycle

*Past repression * uncertainty \Rightarrow distrust \Rightarrow threat perception*

Complex systems approach

- Initial conditions
- Complex interactions among elements of the system
- Positive feedback
- Lock-in


Iterated prisoners' dilemma

Prisoners' dilemma

		prisoner B			
		confess		remain silent	
prisoner A	confess	 5 years 5 years	 0 year 20 years		
	remain silent	 20 years 0 year	 1 year 1 year		

- Defection is the dominant strategy
- Cooperation arises only if the game is played > 1 times

Iterated prisoners' dilemma



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Government-opposition interactions

- Distrust & uncertainty
- Payoffs: coming to power and staying in power $>$ sharing power or compromising on certain policies $>$ losing to the opponent
- Experience with repression while in opposition \rightarrow retaliation while in power
- Perception of threat from the opposition
- “Repress” as a punishment strategy in a sequential game

Government-opposition interactions


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What is oscillation?



Oscillation refers to back-and-forth movements along the democracy-authoritarianism axis.

Authoritarianism

Democracy



Electoral democracy & freedom of opposition in Turkey



Democratization & constitutional changes: Turkey

- Democratization: (1946–1955), (1961–1968), (1971–1974), and (1983–2004)
- Democratic reversals: (1958–1961), (1968–1971), (1978–1982), and (2004–today)
- Constitutional changes (1946, 1961, 1982, 1987, 2007, 2010, and 2017)



Sequencing

- Auth & liberalization demands (1923–1945) →
- → constitutional developments under auth (1946) →
- → liberalization (1946–1954) →
- → auth revival & liberalization demands (1955–1960) →
- → coup (1960) →
- → constitutional developments under auth (1960–1961)→
- → liberalization (1961–1968)→

Sequencing (cont'd)

- → auth. revival & liberalization demands (1971–1974) →
- → coup (1980) →
- → constitutional developments under auth (1982) →
- → liberalization (1983–2004) →
- → auth revival & liberalization demands (2004–2016) →
- → constitutional developments under auth (2016).

Electoral democracy & freedom of opposition in the Ottoman Empire



Sequencing

- constitutional developments under auth (1789–1856)
- → liberalization demands (1860s)
- → auth breakdown & constitutional developments (1876)
- → auth revival (1877–1908)
- → liberalization demands (1880–1908)
- → auth breakdown & constitutional developments (1908)
- → auth revival (1910–1922)

Patterns

Ottoman Empire



Turkey



Cycles

- Hamidian authoritarianism
- Progress and Union Party Regime (1908–1914)
- Single-Party Period (1923–1946)
- Democrat Party (DP) regime
- (1960–1980) Military coup & polarization
- (1980–2004) Military coup & center-right coalition governments
- Justice and Development Party (AKP) regime

From Ottoman to Modern Turkey (1920–1946)


- **Parliament vs. Sultan**
- CHP formed within the Parliament
- Dismantle old institutions; e.g., the Caliphate, the Sultanate
- Modernization reforms
- Dissent (the Sheik Said Revolt, Dersim...)
- Failed attempts to transition to multiparty system (e.g., Serbest Firka)
- Multi-party system → antiestablishment elites in power

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
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Change of elites (1950s, 1960s)

- Democrat Party vs. CHP (1946)
- DP government & reforms
- Dissent → Democrat Party vs. opposition parties
- Authoritarian revival → Protests → more repression
- The 1960 Coup



Axes of conflict & cyclic pattern



Concluding Remarks

- Past repression * uncertainty & distrust → Government turns defensive of reforms → Dissent perceived as threat
- Authoritarianism transcends ideology
- Auth—democratization cycle =f(zero-sum interactions)

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Thank you!

Why constitutionalism? (1908—1914)

Year	Document	State	Nationalism	Representation	Equality	Other	Reform Type
1908-1914	CPU_1913 <u>Tesebbus-u Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti Ittihad-I Muhammedi Firkasi</u>	state, national integrity	national representation, equality	Turkish nationalism		Yes	Top down reform
	<u>Fedakaran-I Millet Cemiyeti Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi</u>	Constitutional state, liberal democracy	decentralization, local autonomy	Multicultural society		Secularization	Reform
	<u>Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi</u>	Return to theocracy	representation, equality	Muslim brotherhood		Conformity to the Sharia	Incremental reform
	<u>Osmanli Demokrat Firkasi</u>	state, national integrity	national representation, equality	Turkish Nationalism			Incremental reform
	<u>Osmanli Demokrat Firkasi</u>	Political pluralism, Civil liberties	decentralization, local autonomy			Secularization	Incremental top-down reform
	<u>Osmanli Demokrat Firkasi</u>					Economic modernization Economic liberalization	Incremental reform
	<u>Osmanli Demokrat Firkasi</u>					<u>Statism</u>	Incremental top-down reform
	<u>Osmanli Demokrat Firkasi</u>						

Why constitutionalism?

<u>Mutedil</u> <u>Hurriyetperver</u> <u>an Firkasi</u> <u>Islahat-I</u> <u>Esasiye-I</u> <u>Osmaniye</u> <u>Firkasi</u>	national representation, equality	Multicultural society Muslim brotherhood	Conformity to the Sharia	Yes		Incremental top-down reform
<u>Ahali Firkasi</u> <u>Osmanli</u> <u>Sosyalist</u> <u>Firkasi</u> <u>Hurriyet ve</u> <u>Itilaf Firkasi</u> <u>Halaskar</u> <u>Zabitan Grubu</u> <u>Milli</u> <u>Mesruiyet</u> <u>Firkasi</u>	decentralization, local autonomy	Egalitarian society Multicultural society Turkish nationalism		Yes	Incentives to SMEs State-led development Free market economy NA	Coup Social revolution or incremental top down reforms Incremental top-down reform Incremental top-down reform
	national representation, equality	<u>Turkist</u>	Conformity to the Sharia	Yes		Incremental top-down reform

Why constitutionalism? Young Turks (1890s)

Groups	Objective	Minority rights	Nationhood	Islam	Anti-imperial	Change
Ahmed Rıza	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Turkish nationalism	Secularization	Yes	Social revolution
Mizancı Murad	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Turkish nationalism	Sharia	Yes	Social revolution
CPU ulema branch	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Muslim brotherhood	Sharia	Yes	Coup
Tunali Hilmi	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Muslim brotherhood	Sharia	Yes	Coup
CPU activist branch	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Turkish nationalism	NA	Yes	Coup
CPU Berlin branch	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Turkish nationalism	NA	Yes	Coup
Edhem Ruhi	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Turkist	Secularisation	Yes	Coup, local rebellion
Abdullah Cevdet	Strong state, national integrity	local autonomy	Turkish nationalism	Secularisation	No	Coup, local rebellion
Committee of Union and Progress	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Turkish nationalism	Secularisation	Yes	Coup
Ottoman Freedom Society	Strong state, national integrity	national representation	Turkish nationalism	Secularisation	Yes	Coup
Prens Sabahaddin	Constitutionalism, liberal democracy	local autonomy	Multicultural society	Secularisation	No	Coup, local rebellion